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GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS AND THE COMPETITIVE
PROVISION OF QUALITY IN AGRICULTURAL MARKETS
GIANCARLO MOSCHINI, LUISA MENAPACE, AND DANIEL PICK
The economics of geographical indications (GIs) is assessed within a vertical product differentiation
framework that is consistent with the competitive structure of agriculture. It is assumed that certi-
fication costs are needed for GIs to serve as (collective) credible quality certification devices, and
production of high-quality product is endogenously determined. We find that GIs can support a com-
petitive provision of quality and lead to clear welfare gains, although they fall short of delivering the
(constrained) first best. The main beneficiaries are consumers. Producers may also accrue some benefit
if production of the high-quality products draws on scarce factors that they own.
Key words: competitive industry, free entry/exit, geographical indications, Marshallian stability, qual-
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The market provision of quality is notoriously
fraught with difficulties under asymmetric in-
formation: when producers cannot credibly
signal the quality of their products, consumers’
choices are predicated on the perceived aver-
age quality on the market, and this pooling
equilibrium has undesirable welfare proper-
ties. Following Akerlof’s (1970) seminal con-
tribution, such market failures have been the
object of considerable research. One possible
solution has emphasized the role of firms’ rep-
utation as conveyed by their brands (Klein and
Leffler 1981; Shapiro 1983). Brand names must
themselves be informative, of course, and that
in turns requires a credible trademark system.
Trademarks thus serve as useful information
tools for consumers by allowing them to more
readily identify the goods of interest, thereby
reducing the possibility of consumer confu-
sion and economizing on their search costs
(Landes and Posner 1987). Given that effect,
trademarks also provide an incentive for firms
to produce goods of consistent quality, as ex-
pected by consumers, lest they lose consumer
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loyalty and suffer a loss on their investments
in trademark development.1
Brands and trademarks are best understood
in an imperfectly competitive setting. Their
role in agriculture and food production, largely
characterized by competitive market condi-
tions, remains an open question. Individual
firms are typically too small to credibly signal
quality to consumers directly, and this is one of
the justifications for specific types of govern-
ment intervention such as the development of
food standards and grades, a specific mandate
of U.S. federal agencies (Gardner 2003; Lapan
and Moschini 2007).2 Alternatively, producers
could bundle together to achieve the critical
mass required for brand name and trademark
development. A particularly interesting in-
stance of such cooperation in the provision of
quality is represented by the use of geograph-
ical indications (GIs). This use of geographi-
cally based labels to brand products has been
in use for a long time, especially in Europe,
but interest in GIs increased considerably af-
ter they were recognized as a distinct form of
intellectual property (IP) rights in the TRIPS
agreement of the World Trade Organization
1 This standard result of reputation models was anticipated by
Akerlof (1970), (p. 499), who noted that “Brand names not only
indicate quality but also give the consumer a means of retaliation
if the quality does not meet expectations.”
2 Two recent instances of government intervention in food and
agricultural products labeling are the introduction of new organic
food standards by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
in October 2002, and the new regulation for labeling genetically
modified food and feed products in the European Union (EU) in
April 2004.
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(WTO) (Josling 2006). In the context of GIs,
quality attributes of interest to consumers are
presumed linked to the specific geographic ori-
gin of the good and/or particular production
methods used in that region (the notion of
“terroir”), and such attributes cannot be de-
termined through inspection by the consumer
prior to purchasing the good. The fundamental
role of GIs in this setting, therefore, is that of
providing a credible certification mechanism
that solves a real-world information problem.
Some recent contributions have addressed
directly some of the specific economic issues
related to GIs. Zago and Pick (2004) question
the desirability of GIs by showing that, with
an exogenously determined supply of qual-
ity, the welfare implications of a fully credible
certification system based on GIs are ambigu-
ous. In Anania and Nistico` (2004), low-quality
producers can choose to sell their product
on the high-quality market (i.e., to cheat).
Given an imperfect enforcement mechanism,
a GI regulation might be desirable for both
low- and high-quality producers. A few stud-
ies have suggested that GIs can be interpreted
as “club goods” (nonrival, congestible, and ex-
cludable), as discussed in Rangnekar (2004),
chapter 4, and this interpretation is adopted
by Langinier and Babcock (2006). The govern-
ment provides GI certification rights to high-
quality producers, who are free to decide the
size of the club (i.e., who among the high-
quality producers has access to it). Lence et al.
(2007) focus on the problem of developing
new GIs. The key to developing such prod-
ucts is a fixed cost. Certification is implicitly
free in their setting, and thus costless imitation
is possible, so that some degree of supply con-
trol may be necessary to encourage geographic
product differentiation.
In this article, we emphasize that the natural
institutional setting for GIs is that of competi-
tive markets. Contrary to standard trademarks,
which are owned and used by a single firm, GIs
are essentially public goods and are used by
many firms simultaneously. Moreover, the use
of a GI cannot be denied to any producer in the
specified geographical area, an issue that has
been overlooked by previous work. Indeed,
in the European Union (EU) where GIs are
widely used, there are typically no limitations
on which or how many firms can use a given
GI (provided that all product specifications, in-
cluding the geographical origin, are met). Simi-
larly, in the United States where GIs are mainly
protected as certification marks, any firm that
meets the certifying standards is entitled to use
the corresponding certification mark. Accord-
ingly, the purpose of this article is to investi-
gate the impacts of a credible GI certification
system in a competitive market setting char-
acterized by the possibility of free entry, and
we derive and discuss the welfare effects to be
expected in such a context.
Our analysis complements and adds to exist-
ing studies in this area in some novel ways. For
instance, most studies discussed in the forego-
ing (Anania and Nistico` 2004; Zago and Pick
2004; Langinier and Babcock 2006) assume
that producers are ex ante and exogenously
identified as either of the low- or high-quality
type. In particular, high-quality producers sup-
ply the high-quality product regardless of
whether or not they are certified and/or receive
a price premium in the market. We relax this
constraining assumption and allow the (costly)
provision of quality to be endogenously deter-
mined. Furthermore, in our model the produc-
tion of high- and low-quality goods can coex-
ist in equilibrium in the same area, which also
captures a feature of the real world where not
all producers in a given GI region take advan-
tage of their right to supply the GI products.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we an-
alyze explicitly the implications of competitive
entry within a coherent model of quality certi-
fication through GIs, an issue that, to date, has
not been addressed.
In what follows we first review the institu-
tional setting for GIs, with emphasis on poli-
cies implemented in the EU, a leader in the
development and use of GIs. This allows us
to substantiate our premise that both the let-
ter of existing regulations and the observed
practice in the predominance of cases sug-
gest that the relevant market setting is a com-
petitive one. In particular, entry of new firms
that wish to produce GI-certified high-quality
goods is possible. Based on that, we then
specify a model to study how the competi-
tive structure of agricultural production af-
fects the supply of quality in the presence of
a mechanism that mimics the nature of a GI.
The model, although by necessity very stylized,
captures the essential elements of the prob-
lem at hand. In particular, the demand side of
the model is rooted in the economics of prod-
uct differentiation, which provides an attrac-
tive formulation on how consumer preferences
value quality. On the supply side, our model
allows for different production costs for high-
and low-quality goods and permits the supply
of the high-quality (GI-certified) good to be
endogenous.
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The characterization of equilibrium centers
on the competitive conditions with free en-
try/exit. In the benchmark case, in which all
input costs are parametrically given, the need
for costly certification that involves a fixed
cost induces increasing returns to scale at
the industry level. Consequently, the competi-
tive equilibrium is not Pareto efficient; specif-
ically, it underprovides the high-quality good.
This equilibrium, however, does entail welfare
gains relative to the absence of GI certifica-
tion, and thus, it does ameliorate the infor-
mation market failure that motivates interest
in GIs. In this setting, some simple policies
that subsidize the GI certification of quality
would restore Pareto efficiency to the com-
petitive equilibrium. Perhaps not surprisingly,
given the long-run nature of the competitive
equilibrium that we consider, the welfare gains
due to GIs mostly take the form of increased
consumer surplus. The availability of GIs ben-
efits producers only when the production of
the high-quality good draws on scarce factors
owned by producers.
The Institutional Framework
Whereas recent motives of interest in GIs stem
from their recognition as distinct IP rights in
TRIPS and the ongoing efforts to strengthen
such rights, protection of GIs has a long history
in some European countries and elsewhere.
GIs are protected under two similar yet dis-
tinct legal notions: appellations of origin and
marks. The primary difference is that an ap-
pellation of origin requires the existence of a
special tie between the quality of the product
and its geographical origin, whereas in the case
of a mark such a relation is not necessary.3
The EU framework is rooted in its Coun-
cil Regulation (EEC) 2081/92, adopted in
1992, which established an EU-wide harmo-
nized system of protection of GIs for agricul-
tural products and foodstuffs (but excluding
wines and spirits).4 This regulation defines
two types of GIs, Protected Designations of
Origin (PDOs) and Protected Geographical
Indications (PGIs), that differ depending on
how closely a product is linked to geogra-
3 More details and discussion of the GI institutional framework
may be found in OECD (2000) and Josling (2006).
4 Regulation 2081/92 was recently updated by Council Regula-
tion (EC) 510/2006 to comply with the TRIPS agreement. It abro-
gates the “reciprocity principle” and it simplifies the bureaucratic
procedure for application. In particular, it simplifies the procedure
for third-country parties to apply for GI registration in the EU
and/or to pursue opposition against the EU registration of any GI.
phy (European Commission 2007). Protection
under a PDO mandates the more stringent
conditions, as it requires the quality or char-
acteristics of the product must be essentially
or exclusively due to natural and human fac-
tors characterizing the geographic area of ori-
gin (e.g., climate, soil quality, local production
knowledge). Also, for a PDO the entire pro-
duction process, including the production and
processing of raw materials, must occur within
the defined geographic area of origin. In con-
trast, the PGI merely requires that a portion of
a designated product’s characteristics and pro-
duction occur within the specific geographical
area.
PDO or PGI protection can be obtained by
an association of producers and/or processors.
The process requires the definition of so-
called “specifications,” which identify the re-
quired conditions for the GI label, including
the characteristics of the product, the produc-
tion method, and the geographic area of pro-
duction. In addition, the association seeking
protection must designate a third-party inspec-
tion body in charge of the certification and in-
spection along the entire supply chain. Such
activities are meant to ensure that products
carrying PDO or PGI labels comply with the
specifications and to ensure that the informa-
tion conveyed via labeling is verifiable, thus
bolstering the credibility of the GIs system. It
is critical to note that once a product is reg-
istered, all producers within the geographic
region who comply with the product specifi-
cations, regardless of whether or not they are
a member of the association that originally ap-
plied for the registration, are entitled to use the
PDO or PGI label on their product (Article 8
of Regulation 510/2006).5
Over 700 PDO and PGI products are cur-
rently registered in the EU. Table 1 reports
5 An example to illustrate the foregoing is the Italian cheese
Asiago. The protection of the Asiago denomination under Ital-
ian law dates back to 1954, while the PDO status was obtained
in 1996. The Asiago production area comprises a vast region in
north-eastern Italy, encompassing four provinces (Trento, Vicenza,
and parts of the lowland provinces of Padua and Treviso). Physi-
cal and sensorial characteristics as well as production procedures,
from cow-feeding to the cheese ripening process, are outlined in
detail in the production specifications. Local know-how and tra-
ditions (documented as far back as 1,000 AD) are deemed to be
key element in the production of Asiago cheese. The “Consorzio
Tutela Formaggio Asiago” is in charge of supervision, custody, pro-
motion, and development of the denomination. Non-members are
free to brand their product as Asiago PDO as long as production
occurs according to the specifications and the product is certified
by the appointed third-party inspection body. Control and inspec-
tion activities of Asiago producers (both consortium members and
nonmembers) are performed by an independent inspection body
(the “Certificazione Qualita` Agroalimentare s.r.l.”).
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Table 1. Number of PDO and PGI Products in the European Union
Breads Fruits Other
Meat- and Other and Fresh Animal Table
Total Cheese Based Bakery Oils Fish Beer Drinks Vegetables Meat Products Olives Other
Belgium 5 1 2 1 1
Czech Republic 6 1 1 3 1
Denmark 3 2 1
Germany 67 4 8 4 1 2 12 31 2 3
Greece 84 20 1 25 1 22 1 10 4
Spain 105 19 10 7 20 30 13 3 3
France 155 45 4 2 9 2 5 26 51 6 3 2
Ireland 4 1 1 1 1
Italy 159 32 28 3 38 47 2 2 2 5
Luxemburg 4 1 1 1 1
Netherlands 6 4 2
Austria 12 6 2 1 3
Poland 1 1
Portugal 104 12 28 6 21 26 10 1
Slovenia 1 1
Finland 1 1
Sweden 2 1 1
United Kingdom 28 11 3 2 3 1 7 1
Total 747 159 84 20 103 10 17 39 157 104 24 16 14
Source: Compiled by authors from EU data available at http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/foodqual/quali1 en.htm (accessed on October 2007).
their distribution by country and by product
category. The majority of these GIs come from
Mediterranean countries—more than 75% of
the products are registered in five southern
EU states (France, Italy, Greece, Portugal, and
Spain). Nevertheless, the registration of GIs
by northern countries has increased over time.
Of the 268 applications for new denominations
that are currently being considered, more than
half come from countries other than the afore-
mentioned five southern countries (including
eleven from nonmembers countries).
In most other developed countries outside
the EU, the trademark system provides a le-
gal framework for the protection of GIs. In
the United States, geographical names can be
registered as certification marks. Certification
marks are characterized by the fact that the
use of the mark is not restricted to any person
or entity, as long as the attributes required for
certification are met. U.S. certification marks
are typically administered by a governmen-
tal body, the presumption being that such an
agency is best positioned for “. . . preserving
the freedom of all persons in the region to
use the term and, second, preventing abuses
or illegal uses of the mark . . .” (USPTO 2007,
undated, p. 3).6 Similarly to the appellations
6 A well-known example of a U.S. certification mark is that of
Vidalia onions, which is held by the Georgia Department of Agri-
culture (Clemens 2002). Producers must apply for an annual license
from the Georgia Department of Agriculture to sell Vidalia onions,
providing information regarding the type of onions planted, total
number of acres and location. Licenses are free. The production
area covers all or part of the 20 Georgia counties.
system, the product that is labeled with a cer-
tification mark is subject to inspection. Inspec-
tion activities are in this case the responsibility
of the mark’s owner and not of a third-party in-
spection body (but the implications are anal-
ogous because the owner of the certification
mark does not conduct production or commer-
cial activity; it merely concedes the use of the
mark to independent producers).
In some instances, GI protection in the
United State can also be obtained through
individual trademarks or collective marks.
Specifically, that is possible when one can es-
tablish that the geographic term in question
has acquired a “secondary meaning” to con-
sumers. Collective marks identify the products
of many firms belonging to a group (e.g., an as-
sociation or cooperative). They are meant “for
use only by its members . . .” (USPTO 2007, un-
dated, p. 4), and as such they arguably have the
nature of club goods.
TRIPS accords stronger GI protections to
wines and spirits, and even in the EU wines
are treated separately. “Quality wines pro-
duced in a specified region” and table wines
with a “typical geographic indication,” ex-
cluded from Regulation (EEC) 2081/92, are
protected within the framework of the com-
mon market organization for wine (European
Commission 2006). This framework limits the
grape-growing potential of the EU with plant-
ing rights restrictions, including a ban on new
vine plantings. These instruments have only
been partially successful in trying to reduce the
chronic overproduction in the EU (over the
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last two decades the stocks of the aforemen-
tioned protected quality wines have actually
been growing at a faster rate than consumption
and exports to third countries). In any event,
planting rights restrictions apply to total culti-
vation of grapes and do allow shifting wine pro-
duction into GIs, if desired. Indeed, over time,
planting rights have been allocated or reallo-
cated to higher-quality productions, increasing
the incidence of GIs on total wine (European
Commission 2002).
GI Product Markets and Competition
The analysis of the institutional framework for
the protection of GIs in the preceding section
suggests that, typically, all producers located
in the relevant specified production area have
the option to produce and market the corre-
sponding GI product. Thus, it would seem that
competitive entry is a feature of the supply con-
text of GI products that is fully consistent with
most current regulations governing GIs.
Despite the possibility of competitive en-
try/exit, of course, expanding production of
a given GI may be hampered by limitations
on the accessibility of relevant inputs. Given
the great heterogeneity of existing GIs in this
respect, no simple assessment is possible on
how much such a consideration matters. For
instance, if the geographic area identified by
a given GI is sufficiently small, and/or the GI
product accounts for much of the local agri-
cultural production (e.g., Champagne), land
and/or other factors may seriously affect po-
tential supply response. In other cases, such as
those of Greek feta cheese and Italian grappa,
the appropriate geographic area encompasses
virtually a whole country. The actual level of
utilization of GI labels within a specified area
of production also varies significantly among
different GIs, and often a significant share of
total production is commercialized without the
GI label. For example, olive oil produced in the
Italian region of Lazio involves about 130,000
producers who grow olive trees on 195,000
acres. A GI label is used on less than 10% of the
olive oil that could potentially be branded with
any one of the three regional GIs (Sabina PDO,
Canino PDO, or Tuscia PGI) (Carbone 2003).
Similarly, in the case of the Italian wine sec-
tor where a high degree of heterogeneity exists
among different wines, the utilization of GIs is
only about 40% (ISMEA 2005). Thus, consid-
erable expansion of production of a number
of GI wines would seem possible, even given
the overall constraint posed by EU planting
rights.
If it were possible to manage GIs as pri-
vately owned labels with the power to control
total supply, as in the notion of farmer-
owned brands articulated in Hayes, Lence,
and Stoppa (2004), that might create the po-
tential for attractive noncompetitive returns
for GI producers. The lure of noncompeti-
tive returns in agriculture is, of course, not
new; it has been of interest to farmers for
a long time, as evidenced by the history
of the cooperative movement and market-
ing orders in the United States (Crespi and
Sexton 2003).7 Producer associations with di-
rect responsibility for managing GIs (called
“consortia” in Italy) are perhaps best posi-
tioned to pursue noncompetitive goals, espe-
cially when they gather most of the producers
of the relevant GI product. In fact, antitrust
authorities have intervened with regard to a
number of prominent GI products: the Ital-
ian Parma ham and San Daniele ham, the
Italian Grana Padano, Parmigiano-Reggiano
and Gorgonzola cheeses, and the French Can-
tal cheese (OECD 2000). The anticompeti-
tive behavior that was investigated concerned
attempts by producer associations to control
total supply through the imposition of individ-
ual production quotas to their membership and
through market share agreements between the
consortia (OECD 2000). In all cases, after the
antitrust intervention, production quota and
market share agreements were abandoned,
and competitive conditions were restored.8
A final consideration that will inform our
modeling choice concerns the production tech-
nology of GI products. Whereas it is true that
the geographic attributes of GIs are often crit-
ical to support their perceived higher quality,
it should also be clear that there are other ele-
ments of the production technology that are
part of a GI’s specifications and that affect
7 For example, Vidalia onions, mentioned earlier, have had a
federal marketing order since 1989. The order’s provisions endow
growers with some supply control. The effects of the marketing
order, of course, are conceptually distinct from those of the certi-
fication mark.
8 Consortia used to carry out monitoring activities to ensure that
members’ production satisfies the desired specifications. After the
introduction of the 1992 EU regulation on GIs, however, consortia
lost any authority they might have had over the control of produc-
tion, as well as the responsibility for all inspection activities (which
were assigned to independent bodies). In particular, when awarded
a PDO or PGI, consortia had to give up their property right over
the protected name in exchange for the legal protection of the GI
provided by the European regulation (Nomisma 2001). At present,
consortia have custody of the collective brand identifying the GI
and grant its use to producers who meet the requirements.
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not only quality but also the cost of produc-
tion. To illustrate, consider the example of
Parmigiano-Reggiano cheese. The specifica-
tions for this PDO require production to take
place in a clearly delimited region of north-
ern Italy but also mandate a number of other
production constraints. These include restric-
tive cow-feeding guidelines; notably, it is for-
bidden to feed silage to cows that produce
the milk used in manufacturing Parmigiano-
Reggiano (by contrast, use of silage is al-
lowed in the production process of the other
competing parmesan-type cheese, the Grana
Padano). Such restrictions are deemed es-
sential to achieve the desired cheese quality
but are also known to increase considerably
the cost of milk production, by approximately
20% by some estimates (de Roest and Menghi
2000). Similarly, PDO brie production requires
manual techniques that may increase produc-
tion costs by approximately 25% (Benitez,
Bouamra-Mechemache, and Chaaban 2005).
We conclude that, for the case of most GI
products, the presumption that GI producers
have an effective way to control the aggregate
quantity supplied of their product is not ten-
able. Thus, in the model that follows we will
maintain the possibility of competitive entry in
a setting in which producers can elect to sup-
ply either the GI product or its generic coun-
terpart, and where the production of the GI
product entails higher production costs than
its generic counterpart. The implications of the
fact that some necessary factors in the produc-
tion of GIs may be in scarce supply will also be
investigated.
A Model for the Competitive Provision
of Quality Using GIs
The specification of the model that follows
implements all the main features that appear
to be relevant based on the foregoing re-
view of the institutional framework and real
world examples. Specifically, in the model: (a)
consumers value quality as in the standard ver-
tical product differentiation framework; (b)
producers can supply quality by undertaking
production processes that are costlier than
those required for the alternative, low-quality
product; (c) GIs can serve as (collective) qual-
ity certification devices, although for their
function to be credible additional promotion
and certification costs are required; and (d)
producers operate in a competitive industry
(with free entry and exit).
Demand: Vertical Product Differentiation
As with other studies in this area, we presume
that the quality to be supplied through the use
of GIs is valued by consumers within the verti-
cal product differentiation structure of Mussa
and Rosen (1978). Specifically, we consider
the simple unit-demand version of the vertical
product differentiation model whereby each
consumer buys at most one unit of the good
in question and her preferences are described
by the (indirect) utility function
U =
{
q − p if the good is bought
0 otherwise.
(1)
where q ∈R++ indexes the quality of the good,
p ∈ R++ is the price of the good, and the
preference parameter  ∈ [
¯
, ¯] ⊆ R+ indexes
consumer types. The hypothesis here is that of
heterogeneous preferences for quality so that
the population of consumers can be character-
ized by the distribution function G() of the
preference parameter.
More specifically, suppose that there are
only two possible qualities in this market, a
“low” quality qL and a “high” quality qH > qL.
If these two qualities are available at prices pL
and pH , respectively, where pH > pL > 0, then
the consumer decision problem is to select the
action that yields the highest utility among the
three possible options:
U =


qH − pH if the high-quality
good is bought
qL − pL if the low-quality
good is bought
0 otherwise
(2)
To simplify the analysis, as in related studies
in this area, we put further restrictions on the
distributions of consumers. That is, we postu-
late that the distribution G() is uniform and
that  ∈ [0, 1]. The latter condition, in partic-
ular, implies that the market will be “uncov-
ered” (i.e., as long as prices are strictly positive,
some consumers with a low enough  will not
buy anything). More specifically, let
ˆ ≡ pH − pL
qH − qL(3)
˜ ≡ pL
qL
.(4)
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Throughout we will consider the typical case
where 0 < ˜ ≤ ˆ ≤ 1. For that parametric case,
consumers with  ∈ [ˆ, 1] will buy the high-
quality product, consumers with  ∈ [˜, ˆ] will
buy the low-quality product, and consumers
with  ∈ [0, ˜] will buy nothing. For the pop-
ulation of M consumers, market demand is
readily obtained by integrating the unit de-
mand of each consumer given the distribution
of consumer types. For the uniform distribu-
tion assumption invoked earlier, the aggregate
market demand functions are
X DH = M
(
1 − pH − pL
qH − qL
)
(5)
X DL = M
(
pH − pL
qH − qL −
pL
qL
)
.(6)
Sometimes it is convenient to work with the
inverse demand functions. Inverting (5) and
(6), for given quantities Xi ∈ [0, M] (i = L,
H) satisfying XL + XH ≤ M, yields
pH = qH − (qL X L + qH X H )M(7)
pL = qL
(
1 − X L + X H
M
)
.(8)
Equations (7) and (8) display the market’s
willingness to pay for the two qualities, for
given supply levels, but also implicitly define
the willingness to pay for the “additional qual-
ity” that the high-quality good provides over
the low-quality one. By using (7) and (8), the
(inverse) derived demand for the additional
quality (qH − qL) is
pH − pL = (qH − qL)
(
1 − X H
M
)
.(9)
Note that this (market) willingness to pay
for the additional quality depends only on
the quantity supplied of the high-quality good
(because this quantity implicitly defines the
marginal consumer that is indifferent between
purchasing the high- or low-quality good).
Supply: Competitive Production of Quality
We presume a standard competitive industry
populated by numerous (actual or potential)
producers who behave as price takers, and each
of whom can produce either the high-quality
good or the low-quality good (or zero quan-
tity). Initially, we suppose that these producers
are identical and are operating with a pro-
duction technology that admits cost functions
CH(xH) and CL(xL) for the high- and low-
quality goods, respectively, where xi ≥ 0 (i =
H,L) denotes the level of firm’s output for ei-
ther the low- or high-quality product. We as-
sume that the cost functions Ci(xi) are strictly
increasing and display standard U-shaped av-
erage cost curves. In a long-run equilibrium
with free entry and exit, therefore, firms will
be operating at a strictly positive efficient scale.
Furthermore, we assume that CH(x) > CL(x),
∀x > 0. The presumption that the high-quality
good requires a costlier production process is
rather intuitive, as discussed in the preceding
section (e.g., more labor care, need for higher-
quality inputs, need for additional inputs, re-
strictions on the use of some inputs, etc.).
In addition to production cost, to market the
high-quality good, producers need to under-
take costly activities that credibly certify, in the
eyes of consumers, the claimed higher quality.
Such activities may relate to marketing, pro-
motion, and/or monitoring of production stan-
dards. In principle such activities should be
open to each producer individually, as would
be the case for firms marketing with individ-
ual trademarks, and we therefore allow for
that possibility. But the case for GIs rests on
the presumption that firms may not be able to
muster the required resources to do that indi-
vidually, that is, there is scope for producers
to act cooperatively in this regard. Hence, we
interpret GIs as a common brand whereby pro-
ducers can bundle together to share the mar-
keting, promotion, and certification costs that
are necessary for a credible GI. This assump-
tion is quite consistent with the existence of
producer organizations that take an active part
in the marketing of GI products, such as the
consortia discussed in the preceding section.
Specifically, we assume that producers share
the GI promotion and certification costs via a
charge per unit of output produced, so that the
total cost of producing the GI-certified high-
quality product is CH(xH) + xH , where  > 0
is the unit certification cost.9
9 An alternative assumption might be a cost-sharing rule that
takes the form of a per-firm charge. As long as firms are identical, as
postulated here, the two assumptions would appear largely equiv-
alent. The sharing rules that we follow does, however, simplify the
characterization of long-run equilibrium (because the minimum
efficient scale of the high-quality firms is not affected by the size
of ). Also, the assumed rule might be more appealing when the
model is generalized to allow for firm heterogeneity.
 at Iow
a State U
niversity on Septem
ber 30, 2016
http://ajae.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Moschini, Menapace, and Pick Geographical Indications and the Provision of Quality 801
One of the reasons for the existence of an
incentive for firms to share the costs required
for a credible certification is that what these ac-
tivities produce—consumer goodwill toward
the product with the given GI—has the na-
ture of a public good from the producers’
perspective. Some of the required costs are
largely independent of the aggregate quan-
tity of good that is eventually produced; this
would be the case, for example, for activi-
ties connected to marketing, promotion and
advertising, and overhead costs of the pro-
ducer organization in charge of performing
such functions. We measure the cost of such
activities by F > 0. Other costs, however, are
likely to depend on the amount produced. We
contend that this is the case, in particular, for
the portion of certification costs that are meant
to monitor production standards and prevent
cheating and free riding. A credible certifica-
tion system, in fact, must recognize (and deal
with) the possibility that producers purport-
ing to sell a GI product have an incentive to
behave opportunistically (i.e., they may claim
to sell the high-quality good while producing
the low-quality good). Producer organizations
have a variety of mechanisms at their disposal
to monitor and limit the opportunistic behav-
ior of members. In our context, the challenge
is to represent such activities explicitly, so that
their effects on equilibrium can be assessed,
and to do so in a parsimonious way that is
consistent with the rest of the model. To that
end, the enforcement mechanism that we pos-
tulate is a sequential “auditing game” (e.g.,
Rasmussen 2007, pp. 85–87), as follows.
A producer who wants to supply a quan-
tity x of certified, high-quality GI product has
two strategies: to comply with the relevant GI
specifications or to violate them (by producing
the lower-quality good at cost CL(x) < CH(x)
instead). In the enforcement mechanism that
we envision, the monitoring agency moves first
by announcing an inspections policy {, T},
where  ∈ [0, 1] is the probability of inspection
to verify that the product specifications are met
(or, more precisely,  is the fraction of produc-
ers that will be subject to inspection), and T > 0
is a finite penalty that is paid if a producer fails
the inspection. The individual producer then
chooses whether to comply with or to violate
the production specifications. Given this en-
forcement mechanism, the total expected cost
to the producer associated with the “comply”
strategy is CH(x) + x (and the assumption,
of course, of no errors at the compliance-
verification stage), whereas the total expected
cost is CL(x) + x + T if the “violate”
strategy is used.10 Clearly, to induce compli-
ance the minimum penalty needs to be at
least as large as the production cost difference
[CH(x) − CL(x)]. Specifically, for any given
T > [CH(x) − CL(x)] there exists an inspec-
tion probability  ≡ [CH (x) − CL(x)]/T that
makes “comply” a best response strategy for
the producer. Given that, and if the aggregate
returns to producers from everyone complying
(net of the cost of inspections) exceeds those
of tolerating violation, then it is an equilibrium
strategy for the monitoring body to adopt the
policy {, T} at the initial move stage.11
The main point of the foregoing is that com-
pliance is obtained with an inspection prob-
ability that is high enough, given the penalty
level. But such a monitoring scheme is costly
because it requires that firms be inspected with
some probability. Specifically, we assume that
the cost of each inspection that is carried out
is proportional to the level of a firm’s output,
that is, xH , where  > 0. Thus, the expected
monitoring cost for each producer to be certi-
fied is xH .12 Note that, in this setup, the total
monitoring cost is increasing with the number
of producers to be certified, an appealing fea-
ture that is lost when total certification cost is
treated as a fixed cost only.
The remaining question concerns how many
producer groups we should expect to see in
a GI market. As stated earlier, our working
assumption is that the full certification cost,
as given by the fixed cost F and the vari-
able cost of monitoring, is shared among the
members of the producer organization on a
per-unit-of-output basis, with the portion of
total cost attributable to the certification ser-
vice written as xH . Thus, under full cost-
sharing (we will return to this issue later, in
the context of possible policy implications),
if there are n producers sharing such costs, it
must be that xH =  xH + F/n. Given these
10 The presumption is that there is no error in the inspec-
tion/auditing activities. Anania and Nistico` (2004) also rely on a
similar simple and error-free monitoring and enforcing scheme.
11 In this Nash equilibrium, the monitoring agency must carry
out the inspections even though, in equilibrium, compliance is ob-
tained. Thus, we are assuming that the monitoring authority can
credibly commit to carrying out inspections, consistent with the
overall requirement of a certification system that needs to be cred-
ible in the eyes of the consumer.
12 Because only the product T matters to induce compliance,
and because  affects the monitoring cost whereas T does not (in
equilibrium everyone complies and no penalty is assessed), ideally
one would want to make T as high as possible and  as small as
possible. The existing legal and institutional framework (as well as
firms’ limited financial assets), however, likely puts bounds on how
large T can be; given that level of T, the inspection frequency 
can in principle be calculated.
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structural assumptions, the question of how
many producer groups we should expect re-
duces to a simple coalition formation problem.
Suppose that, in a competitive equilibrium,
there are NH producers engaged in the pro-
duction of the high-quality good, each pro-
ducing the same quantity xH , and consider
the possibility of there being m groups of size
n < NH (so that n ≡ NH/m), each indepen-
dently promoting and certifying their high-
quality product. Then this would be a stable
coalition structure if no member can gain by
switching coalitions, that is, by leaving its cur-
rent group to join another group (making the
latter of size n + 1). Thus, the hypothesized
coalition structure would be stable if
F
n
+  xH ≤ F(n + 1) +  xH .(10)
But clearly this cannot hold. The larger coali-
tion attains lower unit promotion and certifica-
tion costs and pulls in new members, so that in
equilibrium we are left with only one (grand)
coalition of size NH .
The other condition we need to check is the
possibility that a member has of defecting from
the coalition with the intention of supplying
the high-quality product on its own. In such a
case, the producer has to undertake the entire
fixed cost F individually but saves the need for
monitoring costs. This possibility is not prof-
itable if
pH x1 − CH (x1) − F
≤ pH xH − CH (xH ) −  xH − FNH
(11)
where x1 is the scale of production of the firm
that incurs F individually.13 For approximately
equal production levels (x1 ∼= xH) and a reason-
ably large number of producers NH , the con-
dition is approximately F ≥  xH . Thus, as
long as the fixed cost of certification is large
enough relative to the monitoring cost, defect-
ing to market the high-quality product with
one’s own trademark is not profitable.
In conclusion, a credible certification system
can be supported by a GI producer association
that implements a simple monitoring scheme.
Assuming that (11) is satisfied, a coalition may
form to supply the high-quality good, and the
13 The production level of the firm that incurs F individually
would differ from that of the firm sharing costs because its cost
structure is changed (it incurs a fixed certification cost instead of a
unit certification cost).
process should lead to just one coalition of size
NH .14 Whereas in equilibrium the scheme may
ensure compliance by producers, it will impose
additional costs on the producers of the high-
quality good. In particular, the total cost func-
tion for low-quality producers is simply CL(xL)
whereas the high-quality firms have a total cost
function of CH(xH) + xH , where  is the cost
of GI certification per unit of output; that is,
 ≡ F
NH xH
+  .(12)
Equilibrium and Welfare
In this section, we consider the long-run par-
tial equilibrium conditions that are relevant
when it is possible for firms to enter and/or
exit the industry of interest (e.g., Mas-Colell,
Whinston, and Green 1995, chapter 10). Ini-
tially we assume no diseconomies at the indus-
try level; that is, the prices of all production
inputs are constant and exogenous to the in-
dustry. For a given output price pL of the low-
quality good, low-quality producers choose
the production level xL that maximizes profit
pLxL − CL(xL). The possibility of entry/exit
drives profit to zero, so that each firm will be
producing at the minimum efficient scale x∗L,
that is, at the point that minimizes average cost
x∗L = arg min
xL
{CL(xL)/xL}.(13)
Let cL ≡ CL(x∗L)/x∗L denote the unit cost for
the low-quality good at this efficient produc-
tion scale. Then, the competitive equilibrium
price for the low-quality good must satisfy15
p∗L = cL .(14)
14 Note that the underlying presumption of a competitive mar-
ket is maintained throughout. Taking for given the U-shaped cost
structure at the farm level that we have assumed, an alternative hy-
pothesis would be to allow the merger of several farms/plants to be
run as a single firm, thereby allowing the fixed cost F to be shared
over a larger (private) output that could then be marketed with a
firm’s own trademark. Such a hypothesis, of course, would lead to
an oligopolistic market structure. We rule that out by assumption
because such a strategy would raise difficult agency problems of its
own. Allen and Leuck (1998) provide a convincing account of why
farming has generally not changed from small family-based firms
to large corporate firms. Indeed, the reasons that slant the trade-off
between moral hazard and specialization in favor of small farm-
ing operation are likely to be even more compelling in the context
of producing the kind of high-quality products identified by the
traditional specifications of GI products.
15 Here and in what follows, we abstract from the possible “in-
teger” problem (technically, a nonconvexity) that arises when the
firms’ efficient scale is strictly positive, so that, strictly speaking, the
long-run industry supply correspondence is an integer multiple of
the efficient scale.
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As for the high-quality good, whether in
equilibrium it will be supplied at all obviously
depends on the level of the required certifi-
cation cost, vis-a`-vis the consumers’ willing-
ness to pay for high quality. In an equilibrium
in which the high-quality good is also sup-
plied, for a given price pH individual producers
choose the production level xH to maximize
profit pHxH − CH(xH) − xH . The possibil-
ity of entry and exit, however, requires the
number of producers NH to adjust to ensure
the zero-profit condition (which, in turn, af-
fects the per-unit certification cost ). Hence, a
long-run equilibrium needs to specify the equi-
librium price p∗H , the equilibrium production
level x∗H of each high-quality firm, the equilib-
rium number N∗H of high-quality firms, and the
equilibrium per-unit certification cost ∗. The
required conditions are
p∗H = C ′H
(
x∗H
) + ∗(15)
p∗H x
∗
H = CH
(
x∗H
) + ∗x∗H(16)
∗x∗H ≡
F
N ∗H
+  x∗H(17)
N ∗H x
∗
H = M
(
1 − p
∗
H − p∗L
qH − qL
)
.(18)
Equation (15) is the optimality condition
for firm-level profit maximization, whereas
equation (16) displays the zero-profit condi-
tion due to the assumed free entry/exit pos-
sibility. For any given per-unit certification
cost, these two equations in conjunction es-
tablish that the equilibrium production level
x∗H must satisfy C ′H (x∗H ) = CH (x∗H )/x∗H . Hence,
as for the low-quality producers, each firm in
equilibrium produces at its minimum efficient
scale (the point that minimizes average cost).
Let cH ≡ CH (x∗H )/x∗H denote the unit produc-
tion cost (not including the certification cost)
of the high-quality product. Then by using
equations (16) and (18), the equilibrium num-
ber of high-quality producers N∗H must satisfy
(qH − qL)
(
1 − x
∗
H N ∗H
M
)
= cH − cL + F
x∗H N ∗H
+  .
(19)
Thus, the equilibrium condition in (19)
equates consumers’ demand for the additional
quality provided by the high-quality good (rel-
ative to the low-quality good), as given by
equation (9) derived earlier, with the addi-
tional (industry) unit cost of producing this ex-
tra quality.16
It is useful to note that, at the industry
level, the per-unit certification cost is declin-
ing in the number of firms that produce the
GI product (because of the assumed fixed cost
of promotion and certification F). The right-
hand-side of equation (19) effectively defines
the competitive “industry supply” function for
the high-quality good. Under the usual as-
sumption that a firm’s individual production is
small relative to industry output, the individual
firm takes the unit cost as parametrically given.
Yet, at the industry level the industry’s unit
cost of production is decreasing in the num-
ber of high-quality producers (i.e., decreasing
in industry output). Any given firm exerts a
positive externality on all other firms by shar-
ing the fixed certification cost F but does not
internalize this benefit in its decision to en-
ter/exit the industry. This positive externality
is a source of increasing returns to scale. This
fact is bound to have relevant implications for
an equilibrium, but it is also the case that such
an instance of parametric external economies
of scale are quite consistent with the exis-
tence of competitive equilibrium (Chipman
1970), although it does give rise to the pos-
sibility of multiple equilibria, as discussed
next.
Rather than solving for the equilibrium
number of firms, one can equivalently solve for
the equilibrium aggregate quantity of the high-
quality product. Define X∗H ≡ x∗HN∗H . Then
from equation (19), X∗H must be a root of the
quadratic equation
q
M
(
X∗H
)2 − (q − c −  )X∗H + F = 0
(20)
where, for notational simplicity, we define
q ≡ qH − qL and c ≡ cH − cL. The roots
of this equation are given by the standard for-
mula:
(q − c −  ) ± √(q − c −  )2 − 4Fq/M
2q/M
.
(21)
16 In an equilibrium in which both the high- and the low-quality
products are supplied, the zero-profit condition of course ensures
that firms are indifferent as to which of the two goods they produce.
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Figure 1. Equilibrium with F < F¯
The sign of the discriminant D ≡ (q −
c −  )2 − 4Fq/M determines whether
we have real roots and, if so, whether we have
one or two roots. Note that dD/dF < 0 so
that, given the other parameters of the model,
there exists F¯ ≡ (q − c −  )2(M/4q)
such that D = 0 when F = F¯ . In such a case,
there is only one real root to the equilibrium
equation. When F > F¯ , there are no real roots,
that is, certification is just too costly and the
competitive equilibrium does not include pro-
duction of the high-quality good. When F < F¯ ,
there are two distinct roots for the quadratic
equation, i.e., we have two candidate equi-
librium solutions X˜ H and X∗H . The case of
F < F¯ is illustrated in figure 1, where the linear
downward-sloping curve represents the con-
sumers’ willingness to pay for the “additional”
quality, and the nonlinear decreasing curve
represents the additional (industry) unit cost
of supplying the high-quality good.
To distinguish between the two candidate
equilibria when F < F¯ we appeal to stabil-
ity conditions, but the choice of the relevant
condition requires some care. Two concepts
with a long history, conventionally labeled as
Walrasian stability and Marshallian stability,
differ in terms of what variable is viewed as
changing in a situation of disequilibrium.17
17 Walrasian stability posits a price change in response to excess
demand at that price, whereas Marshallian stability supposes that
quantity adjusts when supply and demand prices differ at that quan-
tity (e.g., Silberberg 1990, chapter 19).
Whereas the two stability concepts agree when
demand and supply functions have the usual
slope, they yield conflicting conclusions when
the supply curve is sloping downward (in
our case the equilibrium associated with X˜ H
is Walrasian stable, whereas the equilibrium
associated with X∗H is Marshallian stable). An
important element, in such a situation, con-
cerns why the supply function is downward
sloping. When the negative slope reflects the
existence of industry-wide external economies
(the so-called forward-falling supply curve, as
opposed to the case of individual backward-
bending supply curves), Marshallian stability
is arguably more appropriate, and indeed sup-
ported by strong experimental evidence (Plott
and George 1992). Accordingly, in this study
we rely on Marshallian stability and thus iden-
tify X∗H as the stable equilibrium of interest.
We should also note that the Marshallian
stability concept, with its reliance on out-
put adjustment, is appealing in a production
context such as ours that allows for firms’ en-
try and exit. For example, if the supply of
high-quality product were to be to the left
of X∗H , then high-quality producers would be
making positive profits, which would stimulate
entry and thus expansion of the high-quality
supply.
The competitive stable equilibrium satis-
fies some intuitive comparative static prop-
erties. In particular, for the case of F <
F¯ , ∂ X∗i /∂ M > 0, i = H, L (a ceteris paribus
increase in the market size increases the
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Figure 2. Consumer welfare in equilibrium
equilibrium quantities of both goods);18
∂ X∗H/∂ F< 0 < ∂ X∗L/∂ F(e.g., a decrease in the
fixed cost of certification F increases the
equilibrium level of the high-quality good);
∂ X∗H/∂q > 0 > ∂ X∗L/∂q (e.g., a larger qual-
ity markup for the GI product increases the
equilibrium level of this good and decreases
that of the low-quality good); and ∂ X∗L/∂ >
0 > ∂ X∗H/∂ (e.g., a larger unit monitoring cost
decreases the equilibrium quantity of the high-
quality product and increases that of the low-
quality product). The impact of c is, of course,
qualitatively the same as that of the monitoring
cost parameter .
Welfare
One way to articulate the welfare implica-
tion of a GI mechanism is to suppose that
the high-quality good is technologically feasi-
ble but institutional constraints (e.g., lack of
legal protection for the right to use the GI)
prevent the establishment of a coalition of
producers that can credibly deliver the high-
18 The comparative statics properties can be used to further illus-
trate the choice of the relevant stability concept by noting that the
Walrasian-stable solution X˜ H would produce rather counterintu-
itive results. For example, ∂ X˜ H /∂ M < 0 (an increase in the market
size decreases the equilibrium quantity of the high-quality good).
quality good in a competitive fashion. Relax-
ing such constraints would bring about a new
equilibrium with both goods being supplied.
Before the introduction of a GI, only the low-
quality good is supplied, with the competitive
equilibrium condition p∗L = cL. After the in-
troduction of a GI, consumers who do buy the
high-quality good in equilibrium are better off,
whereas consumers who continue to buy the
low-quality good are unaffected. The welfare
properties of the GI equilibrium can be illus-
trated as in figure 2, which relates the equilib-
rium outcome that we have characterized to
the vertically differentiated demand structure
of the model. The downward-sloping lines of
figure 2 depict the marginal utility functions
of the population of M consumers, as implied
by the preference structure in (2) (along with
the assumption that the preference parameter
 is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]). Total con-
sumer surplus is given by the shaded areas.
Of course, to compute the gain in consumer
surplus due to the GI mechanism one needs
to consider that consumers who buy the high-
quality good, in this equilibrium, would still
enjoy some surplus if only the low-quality
good were supplied. The difference between
the two measures is positive whenever the GI
equilibrium entails both types of goods being
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Figure 3. Gains in consumer surplus
supplied. This could be readily established an-
alytically, given the structure of our model, but
a graphical illustration can suffice. Specifically,
the shaded area in figure 3 illustrates the wel-
fare (consumer) gains from the introduction
of a GI by using the demand for the addi-
tional quality of equation (9) employed earlier
to characterize equilibrium.
In conclusion, the foregoing analysis has es-
tablished that the following implications are
derived from the model. First, there are no
profits to producers in equilibrium (as one
would expect in a long-run competitive model
with entry). Second, consumer surplus is af-
fected by the availability of the high-quality GI
product. Any institutional change that makes
GIs feasible could results in sizeable benefits
to consumers (even without returns to pro-
ducers). Finally, only consumers of the high-
quality good derive additional welfare from
the establishment of a GI.
Pareto Efficiency
Not surprisingly, given the existence of (in-
dustry) external economies in this setting, the
competitive equilibrium fails to deliver the
constrained first-best outcome. What we mean
by the qualification “constrained” here is the
choice X0H that a benevolent social planner
would implement, conditional on having to un-
dertake the same certification costs as in com-
petitive equilibrium. To derive such a first-best
allocation, denote with W the gain in wel-
fare brought about by production of the
quantity XH of the high-quality good, relative
to zero quantity of this good (the no-credible-
certification situation). Given the structure of
this model,
W = q
[
2 − X H
M
]
X H
2
− (c +  )X H − F.
(22)
The optimality condition for a maximum of
W reduces to equating the marginal benefit
of the high-quality product to its marginal cost
(provided that W ≥ 0), yielding the first-best
solution
X0H =
(q − c −  )
q
M.(23)
It is readily verified that, at X0H , W ≥ 0 re-
quires the fixed costs of certification to satisfy
F ≤ F 0, where
F0 = M
2q
(q − c −  )2 .(24)
Hence, if the fixed certification costs are too
high (i.e., F > F 0), provision of the high-quality
good is not desirable. But for F ≤ F 0 it is so-
cially desirable to supply the high-quality good
by the given quality-certification technology,
and in that case the optimal provision of the
high-quality good ought to be at the efficient
level X0H given by equation (23).
It is now apparent that the competitive equi-
librium falls short of the first-best allocation in
 at Iow
a State U
niversity on Septem
ber 30, 2016
http://ajae.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Moschini, Menapace, and Pick Geographical Indications and the Provision of Quality 807
two ways. First, because F0 = 2F¯ > F¯ , then if
the fixed cost parameter falls in the domain
F ∈ (F¯, F0), the competitive equilibrium en-
tails X∗H = 0 and yet it is strictly socially desir-
able to have some high-quality good supplied.
Second, even when a competitive equilibrium
exists with X∗H > 0 because F ≤ F¯ , the compet-
itive equilibrium delivers a suboptimal level of
output, that is, X∗H < X
0
H , as can be readily veri-
fied by comparing the solution in equation (23)
with the larger of the two roots in equation (21)
(see figure 3).
The failure of the competitive equilibrium to
deliver the first-best outcome could be reme-
died by simple subsidy policies. In the domain
F ≤ F¯ , the underprovision of the high-quality
good is due to the fact that producers who pay
a share F/X∗H of the fixed costs of certifica-
tion treat that as a marginal cost of production
(and specifically do not internalize the contri-
bution of their decision to enter the industry
on the other firms’ cost of production). One
way to support the first-best outcome via the
competitive equilibrium would be to provide a
lump-sum subsidy to the producer association
(e.g., the consortia) equal to the fixed cost F
of quality promotion. Alternatively, the gov-
ernment could subsidize production by a unit
subsidy s ≡ F/X0H , thereby offsetting the por-
tion of certification costs due to existence of a
fixed cost of certification.
The suggestion is sometimes offered that, to
provide incentive for producer organizations
to engage in the type of marketing and pro-
motion required for a successful GI, it might
be desirable to grant market power (i.e., the
right to control supply) to producer associa-
tions in charge of GIs. In the model of Lence
et al. (2007) this result arises from the assump-
tion that a fixed cost is required to develop
such products (very much as in our setting)
and that there are no certification costs per se.
Because costless imitation is possible in that
context, some degree of supply control may
be necessary (depending on the size of the re-
quired fixed cost) to encourage producers to
develop a geographically differentiated agri-
cultural product. Auriol and Schilizzi (2003),
on the other hand, emphasize that certifica-
tion costs are critical to achieve credibility. Our
model explicitly accounts for the monitoring
costs needed for credible certification, and in
this context we find that market power can-
not improve welfare. Specifically, if F ≤ F¯ , a
competitive equilibrium exists, although it un-
derproduces relative to the first best; granting
market power to a club of high-quality produc-
ers would not help, and actually would make
matters worse by further reducing the quantity
supply away from X∗H (and raise the thorny
question of who, among the ex ante identi-
cal producers, should benefit from the ensuing
noncompetitive profit). Similarly, if F > F¯ , the
competitive equilibrium entails X∗H = 0, but in
this parametric case the right to control sup-
ply is worthless to a producer association (the
industry average cost is everywhere above the
relevant consumer demand).
A final observation might be appropriate at
this juncture. We have seen that the failure of
the competitive equilibrium to deliver the first-
best outcome is very much related to the exis-
tence of the fixed cost F. Insofar as this type of
cost is interpreted as the cost of marketing and
promotion, to convince consumers that indeed
the GI product in question is a high-quality
product, the public authorities’ endorsement
of the GI system (as with the PDOs in the
EU) might be construed as a policy that at-
tempts to lower the firms’ fixed cost of pro-
motion (by conveying relevant information to
consumers) and thus can contribute to the ef-
ficient competitive provision of quality in agri-
cultural markets.19
Upward-Sloping Industry Supply
The fact that there are no returns to produc-
ers in the foregoing model is predicated on
two things: the assumed long-run competitive
structure (i.e., with freedom of entry/exit), and
the constancy of unit costs (no diseconomies
at the industry level). The latter is of course
questionable, and in fact we typically think
of competitive aggregate supply functions in
agricultural markets as being upward-sloping.
Upward-sloping supply functions can arise
when the inputs used by the industry are in
limited supply (e.g., land) and their price is af-
fected by the competitive demand of the indus-
try of interest. One way to make this concept
operational is to endogenize the price of the
(otherwise homogeneous) input with upward-
sloping supply (e.g., Hughes 1980; Lapan and
19 The EU assists member countries in financing measures to pro-
mote agricultural products and food, both in the EU internal mar-
ket and in third countries; see Council Regulation (EC) 2826/2000
and Council Regulation (EC) 2702/1999. These measures include
information campaigns on EU quality and labeling systems, in par-
ticular on the EU system of PDOs and PGIs, and the EU system of
quality wines produced in specified regions. The EU finances 50%
of the cost of these measures, the remainder being met by producer
organizations and/or member states. The current triennial program
targeting the internal market has a total budget of €50.9 million.
A third-country program targets the USA, Canada, India, Japan,
and China and covers wine, fruit, meat, dairy products, olive oil,
and organic product with a total budget of €18.2 million.
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Figure 4. Upward-sloping supply and constant marginal cost of high quality
Moschini 2000). Alternatively, as in Panzar and
Willig (1978), one can presume that all firms
differ in their endowment of a fixed input (e.g.,
location or soil quality) that affects production
costs and that has no alternative use outside the
industry of interest.
Constant Marginal Cost of High Quality
To simplify the approach of Panzar and Willig
(1978), suppose that firms either produce at an
optimal efficient scale x > 0 (for either the low-
or high-quality product) or stay out of the mar-
ket, and that the firms’ individual efficiency is
indexed by a scalar  ∈ [0, ∞). Specifically, the
unit production cost for the low-quality good is
written as cL(), with c′L() ≥ 0. The industry
supply curve of the low-quality good, conse-
quently, is upward-sloping, because increased
output can only come about by the produc-
tion of increasingly less efficient firms. The
production of the high-quality good requires
additional costs, as discussed earlier, and in this
case the unit cost of the high-quality good is
written as
cH () ≡ cL() + (25)
where  is a constant. Hence, here we assume
that the extra cost required to produce the
high-quality good is independent of the effi-
ciency parameter . With this assumption, the
equilibrium condition in equation (20) still ap-
plies. Specifically, to illustrate the equilibrium
when the parameters of the model are such
that both goods are supplied, figure 2 can be
adapted as in figure 4.
Note that in this case producers do enjoy
a non-zero producer surplus in equilibrium
(the shaded area in figure 4). But this return
to producers does not depend on the pro-
duction of the high-quality GI product and
would be the same even if only the low-
quality good were to be supplied. The area
(p∗H − p∗L)X∗H in equilibrium simply accounts
for the additional production cost required
for the high-quality product, and for the need
for marketing and monitoring to deliver a
credible GI certification for the high-quality
good.
Increasing Marginal Cost of the
High-Quality Good
More generally, one could postulate that the
supply of additional quality (qH − qL) is also
upward-sloping. To make the implications of
that condition more transparent, suppose that
the unit production cost of the low-quality
good is the same for all firms and equal to
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Figure 5. Upward-sloping supply due to increasing marginal cost of
high quality
cL, but the production cost of the high-quality
good depends on the firm-specific efficiency
parameter , that is,
cH () ≡ cL + ()(26)
where cL is a constant and ′() ≥ 0. In such
a case, there are clearly no aggregate pro-
ducer returns to producing the low-quality
good, and the possibility of offering the high-
quality good can bring about positive re-
turns to producers (as well as returns to
consumers).
The equilibrium determination of the high-
quality production in our setting is best illus-
trated via the demand for quality upgrades
used to characterize equilibrium. Thus, figure
3 is adapted as in figure 5, where the shaded
areas denote the changes in consumer and pro-
ducer surpluses brought about by the produc-
tion of the high-quality GI product. Thus, it is
certainly possible for the introduction of GI
certification to benefit directly the producers
of the high-quality product, consistent with
the view of those advocating the use of GIs
as a tool for rural development. Our model,
however, makes clear that such an outcome is
by no mean guaranteed, and it depends criti-
cally on the underlying structure of the agri-
cultural production sector. Specifically, what is
required is that production of the high-quality
products requires specialized inputs in scarce
supply. Exactly how that characterizes real-
world GI settings, of course, depends on the
particular case at hand.
Conclusions
In this article, we have developed a model that
treats GIs as an effective certification tool for
high-quality products that attempts to over-
come the very real information problem that
consumers face when quality cannot be readily
ascertained prior to purchasing. This problem
is arguably particularly relevant to food prod-
ucts that originate from a fragmented produc-
tion structure, where individual farmers are
too small to muster a credible quality-signaling
effort. One of our major points is the competi-
tive structure that justifies the need for produc-
ers to act collectively, as with GIs, also carries
implications for the market equilibrium that
arises with a credible GI mechanism. Thus,
our analysis has emphasized the implications
of a competitive equilibrium with the produc-
tion of GI products, including the freedom
of entry/exit in the production of the high-
quality good. Our model has also maintained
an attractive cost structure for the case at
hand (higher-quality GI products are costlier
to produce than their generic counterparts),
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and explicitly models the promotion and mon-
itoring activities required to make the GI a
credible certification system. In addition, the
demand for GI products is modeled in a verti-
cal product differentiation context. This cap-
tures the likely heterogeneity of consumer
preferences vis-a`-vis GI products but also per-
mits generic products to interact meaningfully
with GI products both in the demand and in
the supply side of the model.
The main conclusions of our analysis can be
summarized as follows. First, it is possible to
have competitive provision of quality in agri-
cultural markets, through certification devices
similar to geographical indications. Second, al-
though a competitive equilibrium can exist, be-
cause the GI certification entails fixed costs
shared by all high-quality producers, there
are external economies of scale at the indus-
try level and the competitive equilibrium is
not Pareto efficient. In particular, the com-
petitive equilibrium underprovides the high-
quality good. The failure of the competitive
equilibrium to achieve a constrained first-best
outcome can be corrected by policies that sub-
sidize the certification of the high-quality good.
Also, we find that measures that allows for mar-
ket power (i.e., supply control) for GI producer
associations in this setting are not desirable. Fi-
nally, the implications of entry in a competitive
framework are critical. The possibility of entry
has been neglected in many previous studies,
but, as we have shown, its consideration has im-
portant implications for the welfare results that
may be deduced. In particular, whereas the
resolution of the “lemons” problem that the
credible certification through GI makes pos-
sible clearly benefits consumers, what it does
for the welfare of producers in a competitive
setting ultimately depends on the presence of
scarce factors that they own.
Whereas it is hoped that this article has con-
tributed to the clarification of some basic eco-
nomic effects associated with the use of GIs
as quality certification devices for agricultural
products, the analysis that we have proffered
has some limitations. In particular, we have
analyzed the case of a closed economy and
considered the role of one GI system in iso-
lation. Among the interesting additional ques-
tions that arise, one may want to consider the
interaction and competition of several GIs,
possibly from different geographic regions in
the same country/jurisdiction, and/or the in-
teraction of GIs and other quality labeling
(e.g., organic food labels), including the issue
of possible excessive label proliferation. Also,
as noted earlier, GIs are of interest in the on-
going WTO negotiation and their implemen-
tation is a question of intense disagreement
among countries (Fink and Maskus 2006). De-
veloped countries are themselves divided on
this topic, with a simmering transatlantic dis-
pute rooted in contrasting approaches to trade,
IP, and agricultural policy (Josling 2006). A va-
riety of perspectives are invoked as germane
in this setting, ranging from familiar economic
arguments for IP protection (Moschini 2004)
to the view of GIs as a tool to safeguard cul-
tural heritage, and to foster the preservation
of traditional methods of production (Broude
2005). Thus, it may be desirable to explore
the international trade implications of the ex-
panding reach of GIs, addressing explicitly the
current WTO negotiation. Such desirable ex-
tensions, which are the object of current re-
search, should benefit from the benchmark
analysis presented in this article.
[Received June 2007;
accepted December 2007.]
References
Akerlof, G.A. 1970. “The Market for Lemons: Qual-
ity Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism.”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 84:488–500.
Allen, D.W., and D. Leuck. 1998. “The Nature of the
Farm.” Journal of Law and Economics 41:343–
86.
Anania G., and R. Nistico`. 2004. “Public Regula-
tion as a Substitute for Trust in Quality Food
Markets: What if the Trust Substitute cannot
be Fully Trusted?” Journal of Institutional and
Theoretical Economics 160:681–701.
Auriol, E., and S. Schilizzi. 2003. “Quality Signal-
ing through Certification. Theory and an Ap-
plication to Agricultural Seed Market.” IDEI
Working Paper No. 165.
Benitez, D., Z. Bouamra-Mechemache, and
J. Chaaban. 2005 “Public Labeling Revisited:
The Role of Technological Constraints Under
Protected Designation of Origin.” Working
Paper, University of Toulouse, Paris.
Broude, T. 2005. “Culture, Trade and Addi-
tional Protection for Geographical Indica-
tions.” Bridges 9(9):20–22.
Carbone, A. 2003. “The Role of Designation of Ori-
gin in the Italian Food System.” In S. Gatti, E.
Giraud-He´raud, and S. Mili, eds. Wine in the
Old World: New Risks and Opportunities, p.
29–39. Franco Angeli: Milan, Italy.
 at Iow
a State U
niversity on Septem
ber 30, 2016
http://ajae.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Moschini, Menapace, and Pick Geographical Indications and the Provision of Quality 811
Chipman, J.S. 1970. “External Economies of Scale
and Competitive Equilibrium.” Quarterly
Journal of Economics 84(3):347–85.
Clemens R. 2002. “Why Can’t Vidalia Onion
Be Grown in Iowa? Developing a Branded
Agricultural Product.” MATRIC Briefing Pa-
per 02-MBF.
Crespi, J.M., and R.J. Sexton. 2003. “Competition,
US Farmer Cooperatives and Marketing Or-
ders.” English translation of: “Concurrence,
coope´ratives de producteurs et Marketing
Orders aux Etats-Unis.” E´conomie Rurale
(277/278):135–51.
de Roest, K., and A. Menghi. 2000. “Reconsid-
ering ‘Traditional’ Food: The Case of Parmi-
giano Reggiano Cheese.” Sociologia Ruralis
40(4):439–51.
European Commission. 2002. “Ex-post Evalua-
tion of the Common Market Organization for
Wine.” Final Report, European Commission
DG-Agriculture.
——. 2006. “Wine Common Market Organiza-
tion.” Working Paper, European Commission,
Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural
Development.
——. 2007. “European Policy for Quality Agricul-
tural Products.” Fact Sheet of the European
Commission, Directorate-General for Agricul-
ture and Rural Development.
Fink, C., and K. Maskus. 2006. “The Debate on Geo-
graphical Indications in the WTO.” In R. New-
farmer, ed. Trade, Doha, and Development: A
Window into the Issues, pp. 201–211. Washing-
ton DC: World Bank.
Gardner, B. 2003. “U.S. Food Quality Standards: Fix
for Market Failure or Costly Anachronism?”
American Journal of Agricultural Economics
85:725–30.
Hayes, D., S.H. Lence, and A. Stoppa. 2004.
“Farmer-Owned Brands?” Agribusiness 20(3):
269–85.
Hughes, J.P. 1980. “The Comparative Statics
of the Competitive, Increasing-Cost Indus-
try.” American Economic Review 70(3):
518–21.
ISMEA. 2005. I vini DOCG, DOC e IGT. Aspetti
normativi, economici e di mercato, Istituto di
Servizi per il Mercato Agricolo Alimentare,
Rome, Italy.
Josling, T. 2006. “The War on Terroir: Geographi-
cal Indications as a Transatlantic Trade Con-
flict.” Journal of Agricultural Economics 57:
337–63.
Klein, B., and K.B. Leffler. 1981. “The Role
of Marker Forces in Assuring Contractual
Performance.” Journal of Political Economy
89(4):615–41.
Landes, W.M., and R.A. Posner. 1987. “Trademarks
Law: An Economic Perspective.” Journal of
Law and Economics 30:265–309.
Langinier, C., and B. Babcock. 2006. “Agricultural
Production Clubs: Viability and Welfare Impli-
cations.” CARD Working Paper 06-WP 431.
Lapan, H., and G. Moschini. 2000. “Incomplete
Adoption of a Superior Innovation.” Econom-
ica 67:525–42.
——. 2007. “Grading, Minimum Quality Standards,
and the Labeling of Genetically Modified Prod-
ucts.” American Journal of Agricultural Eco-
nomics 89:769–83.
Lence, S.H., S. Marette, D. Hayes, and W. Fos-
ter. 2007. “Collective Marketing Arrangements
for Geographically Differentiated Agricultural
Products: Welfare Impacts and Policy Implica-
tions.” American Journal of Agricultural Eco-
nomics 89:947–63.
Mas-Colell, A., M.D. Whinston, and J.R. Green.
1995. Microeconomic Theory. New York: Ox-
ford University Press.
Moschini, G. 2004. “Intellectual Property Rights
and the World Trade Organization: Retrospect
and Prospects.” In G. Anania, M. Bohman, C.
Carter, and A. McCalla, eds. Agricultural Pol-
icy Reform and the WTO: Where Are We Head-
ing? pp. 474–511. Cheltenham, UK: Edward
Elgar.
Mussa, M., and S. Rosen. 1978. “Monopoly and
Product Quality.” Journal of Economic Theory
18(2):301–17.
Nomisma. 2001. Prodotti tipici e sviluppo locale:
Il ruolo delle produzioni di qualita` nel fu-
turo dell’agricoltura italiana, VIII Rapporto
Nomisma sull’agricoltura italiana, Edizioni Il
Sole 24 ore, Milano, Italy.
OECD. 2000. “Appellations of Origin and Ge-
ographical Indications in OECD Member
Countries: Economic and Legal Implica-
tions.” Working Paper COM/AGR/APM/TD/
WP(2000)15/FINAL, Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development, Paris.
Panzar, J.C., and R.D. Willig. 1978. “On the Com-
parative Statics of a Competitive Industry with
Inframarginal Firms.” American Economic Re-
view 68(3):474–8.
Plott, C.R., and G. George. 1992. “Marshallian vs.
Walrasian Stability in an Experimental Mar-
ket.” Economic Journal 102:437–60.
Rangnekar, D. 2004. The Socio-Economics of
Geographical Indications, UNCTAD-ICTSD
Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development,
Issue Paper No. 8.
Rasmussen, E. 2007. Games and Information: An
Introduction to Game Theory, 4th ed. Malden,
MA: Blackwell Publishing.
 at Iow
a State U
niversity on Septem
ber 30, 2016
http://ajae.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
812 August 2008 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
Shapiro, C. 1983. “Premiums for High Quality Prod-
ucts as Returns to Reputation.” Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics 98(4):659–80.
Silberberg, E. 1990. The Structure of Economics, 2nd
ed. New York: McGraw-Hill.
USPTO. 2007. “Geographical Indication Protection
in the United States.” United States Patent
and Trademark Office, undated document
accessed on May 2007. Available at http://www.
uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/globalip/pdf/
gi system.pdf
Zago, M.A., and D. Pick. 2004. “Labeling Policies
in Food Markets: Private Incentives, Public In-
tervention, and Welfare Effects.” Journal of
Agricultural and Resource Economics 29(1):
150–65.
 at Iow
a State U
niversity on Septem
ber 30, 2016
http://ajae.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
